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Abstract 
 
For some months now, discussions over how Greece will restructure its debt have 
been constrained by the requirement that the deal be “voluntary” – implying that 
Greece would continue debt service to any creditors that choose retain their old bonds 
rather than tender them in an exchange offer. In light of Greece’s deep solvency 
problems and lack of agreement with its creditors so far, the notion of a voluntary 
debt exchange is increasingly looking like a mirage.  In this essay, we describe and 
compare three alternative approaches that would achieve an orderly restructuring but 
avoid an outright default: (1)  “retrofitting” and using a collective action clause 
(CAC) that would allow the vast majority of outstanding Greek government bonds to 
be restructured with the consent of a supermajority of creditors; (2) combining the use 
of a CAC with an exit exchange, in which consenting bondholders would receive a 
new English-law bond with standard creditor protections and lower face value; (3) an 
exit exchange in which a CAC would only be used if participation falls below a 
specified threshold. All three exchanges are involuntary in the sense that creditors that 
dissent or hold out are not repaid in full.    
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Greece’s attempt to restructure its private sector creditors appears stuck. It has been 
held back by two problems. First, agreement with a committee of large institutional 
creditors, led by banks, has been elusive thus far. Second, conditional on such an 
agreement, some creditors may feel a strong temptation to free ride – that is, to hold 
out for full repayment. The two problems are distinct but related. Concerns about free 
riders may be one of the reasons why the creditor committee has been reluctant to 
agree to a large net present value “haircut” on its claims. Conversely, lack of such an 
agreement makes it much more difficult to take legal steps – for example, via so-
called collective action clauses (CACs) – that would preclude free riding.    
 
The result is a difficult situation for both Greece and its creditors. A debt restructuring 
within the broad parameters agreed at the October 26th EU summit, which assumed 
both a large haircut and high creditor participation, is a pre-condition for continued 
official support. Without such support, it is hard to see how Greece can avoid a 
default on EUR 14.5 bn in bond repayments falling due on March 20, 2012.  
 
This essay examines three alternative ways in which Greece and its creditors can get 
out of this trap. It argues that at this stage, any of these avenues requires abandoning 
the principle of “voluntariness” which Greece’s restructuring efforts have so far 
respected – namely, the promise (explicit or implicit) to continue paying creditors 
regardless of whether they take part in the restructuring or “hold out”. However, 
giving up the voluntariness principle does not mean that Greece’s debt restructuring 
needs to be chaotic or unlawful. Indeed, although all three avenues discussed below 
would probably lead the rating agencies to declare Greece in selective default, they 
are unlikely to entail a default event as defined in Greece’s current bond contracts. 
Further, one of the three avenues discussed below (Option 3) would probably not 
trigger Creditor Default Swap (CDS) contracts – a contributing cause of the fixation 
with “voluntary” restructurings, until now. 
 
The Limits of the Voluntary Approach   
 
Greece and its official creditors have so far insisted on the principle that any debt 
restructuring should be voluntary – an aim that is sometimes derided as either 
hypocritical or delusional by economists and the media. However, an examination of 
                                                 
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be taken to represent the 
views of EBRD or any other institutions that the authors are affiliated with. We thank Ross Buckley, 
Jonathan Charles, Christoph Denk, Anna Gelpern, Steve Rattner and Shahin Vallee for comments, 
without implying that they agree with our ideas. 
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the theory and experience with voluntary debt exchanges suggests that these are not as 
hopeless as is often assumed.2 In a recent paper (Gulati and Zettelmeyer, 2012) we 
show that voluntary exchange offers can in some circumstances be consistent with 
large reductions in the net present value of debt. This is the case when creditors are 
worried that even conditional on a successful debt exchange, the country is not out of 
the woods, and the new bonds are expected to outperform the old bonds in the event 
of a future default or restructuring. This could be the case because the new bonds pay 
back some cash upfront (or alternatively, have a collateralised principal), or because 
creditors are offered foreign law bonds that afford them better protections in the event 
of a future restructuring. The latter is easy to do in the case of Greece, since the bulk 
of outstanding Greek government bonds were issued under Greek law, with minimal 
contractual protections. Since it is easier to involuntarily restructure these bonds than 
standard English-law bonds (namely, by changing domestic law), creditors who fear 
an involuntary restructuring should have a strong incentive to switch out of these 
bonds, even if at the price of a haircut.3 This argument will apply to both small and 
large creditors, and hence limit the temptation to free ride. 
 
At the same time, it is easy to see the limitations of the argument. Swapping bonds 
against a combination of cash-on-hand and new bonds promising much lower 
repayments but better creditor protection will only be attractive if the alternative is to 
be stuck with the old bond for some time – a time period during which an involuntary 
restructuring might well happen. For bondholders that are expecting repayment in the 
near term, this is unlikely to hold: for them, the alternative is full repayment with near 
certainty. Hence, a voluntary exchange offer involving a 50 percent face value 
reduction will never persuade the holders of the EUR 14.5 bn of Greek government 
bonds whose final payments are due in less than two months to trade their bonds, no 
matter how cleverly designed. The same argument is likely to also apply, with a little 
less force, to other Greek government bonds coming due over the next year. 
  
As a result, we estimate that the cost of the purely voluntary approach in restructuring 
the Greek debt, even under the most favourable assumptions, will be to limit the 
exchange to about 80 percent of eligible bonds in the hands of the private sector. In 
Greece’s dire situation, this may just not be good enough. The prospect is also 
unattractive for the members of the creditor committee negotiating with Greece. No 
bank negotiator will relish the prospect of going before his Board of Directors to 
explain why he recovered 30 cents on the Euro while some hedge fund across the 
street recovered 100 cents. Hence, full participation should ultimately be in the 
interests of both Greece and creditors collectively. In this light, it makes sense that 
Greek officials have in recent days insisted that their objective is full, or almost full, 
creditor participation in the exchange.  
 
But the inescapable implication of this objective is that the exchange cannot be fully 
voluntary, in the sense that holdouts must not be promised full repayment. Rather, 
they must expect to be (involuntarily) “bailed in” if they do not accept the exchange 
offer. 
                                                 
2 For a critique of voluntary exchanges, see Aizenman et al (2005).  For a historical overview and some 
examples, see Zettelmeyer (2012), which draws on ongoing work by Trebesch and Zettelmeyer (2012). 
3 The argument that voluntary or market-based sovereign debt restructurings can help reduce the debt 
burden if the new debt is senior (whether de jure or de facto) to the old debt is not new.  It goes back at 
least to the 1980s.  See, for example, Claessens et al (1990). 
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There is a tool to achieve this lawfully: collective action clauses (CACs) that make a 
change in payment terms agreed between Greece and a qualified majority of 
bondholders binding for all creditors. To prevent potential holdouts from buying 
blocking minority positions in individual bond issues, these clauses would need to 
apply in the aggregate across all bonds, rather than bond-by-bond. Such clauses do 
not currently exist in Greek law bonds. However, they could be “retrofitted” through a 
change in domestic Greek law (Buchheit and Gulati, 2010). 
 
With such clauses in place, and assuming Greece and its backers are reconciled to 
taking the involuntary restructuring path, there are in principle three strategies to 
conduct an orderly exchange that prevents free riding. The difference between the 
three is that the first would solely rely on CACs, the second on a combination of 
CACs and an exchange offer, and the third on an exchange offer in which CAC’s are 
in the background, but would not be invoked.  
   
Option 1: Just a CAC  
 
The most widely used CAC allows for the “payment” terms (principal, interest, dates 
and currency of payment) to be modified with a vote of 75 percent or more of the 
bonds in principal amount.  Assuming Greece can obtain agreement from the 
necessary 75 percent to reduce its payment obligations, it can force the remaining 
creditors to agree.  Eighteen months ago, when the vast majority of Greek bonds were 
in the hands of European financial institutions, obtaining this vote may have been a 
relatively easy matter.  These financial institutions would have both had sufficiently 
large holdings of Greek debt and have been sufficiently involved in business 
relationships with Greece and its official creditors to resist the temptation to free ride. 
Today, however, many of those bonds have migrated into the hands of hedge funds 
whose strategy is to hold out from any attempt at restructuring in the hope of getting 
paid in full or extract a favourable settlement. Another complicating factor is that a 
large volume of bonds – perhaps up to 20 percent of outstanding Greek government 
bonds – are in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB). The members of 
Greece’s creditor committee are hence likely to represent significantly less than 75 
percent of the face value of the debt outstanding. Assuming that the ECB would not 
be voting its bonds (it has so far resisted any haircut on its holdings), this makes it 
virtually impossible for Greece to get past the magic 75 percent threshold it needs so 
as to implement the CAC.   
 
There are potential solutions to these problems, but none of them is easy. A solution 
to the ECB problem would be for Greece to buy back its government bonds from the 
ECB at the price at which the ECB bought them on the market. Alternatively, the 
ECB could participate in the restructuring on condition that Greece compensates it for 
the difference between the value of the new bonds and the value at which it bought 
the old bonds. Either of these solutions would avoid a fiscal transfer from the ECB to 
the Greek sovereign in potential contravention of its mandate.4 Assuming that the 
ECB would agree to this, there remains the problem of how Greece would obtain the 
funds to pay for a buy-back from or compensation to the ECB. In all likelihood, this 
                                                 
4  It would also take account of the fact that the ECB secondary market purchases were part of an 
official crisis intervention.  That arguably gives it an informal claim to seniority over the private sector 
(as is typically claimed by the IMF). 
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would require additional financing from the official creditors (for example, through 
the EFSF).    
 
But even assuming the ECB holdings could be brought into the voting pool, the 
necessary super majority of seventy-five percent might be hard to reach.  One option 
here is to reduce the vote required to alter payment terms (for example, to a simple 
majority).  At first cut, this does not appear difficult.  After all, Greece is retrofitting 
the CACs by legislative fiat.  If it can retrofit a 75 percent vote requirement to change 
payment terms, it can just as easily use 50 percent.  The problem, however, is that the 
further below 75 percent the vote threshold gets moved, the more the risk of litigation 
increases.  Seventy-five percent is a magic number because it is, roughly speaking, the 
dominant market standard.5  As best we are aware, it is also likely to be the standard 
for the new model Eurozone CACs that every Eurozone sovereign debt instrument is 
supposed to include starting later this year.  A court, in deciding whether the Greek 
state acted unlawfully implementing the retrofit CACs is likely to take into 
consideration the fact that Greece did nothing more than utilize the market standard 
provision. 
 
Another option would be to specify that the 75 percent applies in the context of a 
physical meeting of the bondholders and where the denominator is the number of 
bondholders who show up to the meeting or submit proxies, subject to a reasonable 
quorum requirement, such as 50 percent.  This particular formulation of a CAC, 
where the vote takes place as a function of a meeting, is a less widely used 
formulation than the one discussed above.  However, it is still a familiar formulation, 
particularly in sovereign bonds issued under English law. There are downsides 
though.  First, utilizing the CAC plus meeting mechanism will mean that Greece will 
first have to give creditors some reasonable amount of notice (our impression is that 
roughly three weeks is standard) so as to pass muster with a court.  Given the urgency 
with which the deal needs to get done, Greece may not have the luxury of being able 
to provide a three-week notice period.  Second, there is a reason why the practice of 
requiring meetings among bondholders has been waning.  Allowing creditors to have 
a meeting might enable them to coordinate over how to better resist the Greek offer.     
  
Option 2. A CAC Plus an Exit Exchange 
 
Assuming Greece has difficulty getting 75 percent of the creditors to agree to its 
exchange offer, the next step is to ask how it might further incentivize creditors to 
take the deal.  One way to do that is to combine the CAC with what is called an Exit 
Exchange offer. As with Option 1 (Just a CAC), Greece would ask its creditors to 
vote in favour of reducing its payment obligations.  The difference would be that here, 
in exchange for their vote, Greece would allow each consenting bondholder to exit 
their old Greek law bonds and enter into new English law bonds, involving some 
cash-on-hand but 50 percent lower face value, that would be bolstered by a variety of 
standard contractual protections (negative pledge clauses, pari passu clauses, cross 
default clauses, etc.) that standard English law bonds contain but the local Greek law 
bonds do not.   
                                                 
5 Seventy-five percent is the typical vote requirement to change payment terms in individual sovereign 
bond issues today.  The type of CAC being contemplated for Greece, however, is an aggregation 
provision that is not typically found in sovereign bonds.  And to the extent it has been used by a 
handful of sovereigns such as Uruguay, the required vote at the aggregated level is 85 percent.     
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A debt exchange offer of this type might be persuasive even to small creditors who 
are potential free riders, because they would not want to be left with bonds that both 
have had their payment obligations modified (via a CAC) and have been de facto 
subordinated. In the next restructuring, the local law bonds would remain highly 
vulnerable, whereas the English-law bonds will be relatively protected. If a new 
restructuring is viewed as sufficiently likely, this would provide a powerful incentive 
to take the offer, and hence lead to higher participation. Further, the litigation risk 
from taking this approach is low.  In contrast to past restructurings, when the Exit 
Exchange technique was used to take away rights of existing bondholders by 
changing the non-payment terms of their bonds,6 the technique offers an upgrade of 
creditor rights to creditors that accept the exchange offer (Gulati and Zettelmeyer, 
2012).  
 
The benefit of this technique of combining a CAC and an Exit Exchange is that it has 
the potential to obtain a very high level of creditor consent.  Prior uses of this 
technique in the sovereign context have garnered upwards of 90 percent creditor 
participation.  That means that Greece might be able to get to a 75 percent vote even 
without buying back the ECB bonds or having the ECB vote in favour of exchanging 
its bonds, though the latter would clearly be the safer approach.  
 
Option 3. An Exit Exchange in the Shadow of a CAC  
 
An important motivation for trying to do the Greek debt exchange on a voluntary 
basis was a concern about triggering CDS contracts written on Greek debt.  Both of 
the options described above would trigger the standard CDS. If a CAC is used to bind 
a dissenting minority of creditors, that typically constitutes a “restructuring” credit 
event for purposes of these CDS contracts.  However, there may be a way of 
combining a CAC and an exchange offer that would not actually lead to the use of 
CACs “in equilibrium” (to use the economists’ patois). In other words, a CAC would 
be retrofitted and the use of the CAC would be explicitly or implicitly threatened but 
would not be invoked. This approach would work as long as a supermajority required 
to invoke the CAC is inclined to take the exchange offer, so that the threat is credible.   
 
To see how this would need to be designed, suppose that Greece first undertakes an 
exit exchange and then activates a CAC if participation in the exchange has fallen 
short of the objective. This strategy will not work.  By the time that Greece would 
want to invoke the CAC (say because only 75 percent rather than the desired 99 
percent or more exchanged their bonds), all of the creditors who would have voted for 
the CAC would have already exited.  The only creditors left to apply the CAC will be 
those who oppose it; and these creditors will presumably vote against its use.  
 
However, there is a way to modify the sequence of events that gets around that 
problem. Many past restructurings have involved exchange offers that were 
conditional on minimum participation thresholds. In this case, the mechanics of the 
offer envisages two stages. First, bondholders are invited to submit irrevocable 
commitments to tender their bonds, conditional on a minimum overall participation in 
                                                 
6 The sovereigns that have used this technique are Ecuador (2000), Uruguay (2003) and the Dominican 
Republic (2005). On the use of this technique, see Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007); Buchheit and 
Gulati (2000). 
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the exchange. In a second stage, an exchange agent first verifies whether the overall 
participation in the exchange exceeded the pre-specified threshold. Only if this is the 
case do bondholders that agreed to tender receive their new bonds, and the title to the 
old bonds passes to the debtor. 
  
Now suppose that in the first stage, bondholders are invited not just to submit 
commitments to tender their old bonds conditional on a minimum participation level.  
They are also asked to authorise the exchange agent to vote on their behalf for a pre-
specified change in the payment terms of the old bonds if and only if participation 
does not exceed a second, higher threshold. For example, the offer could specify that: 
 
 If participation falls below 75 percent – which we assume to be the threshold 
at which CACs can be invoked – the exchange offer is withdrawn; 
 If participation exceeds 99 percent, the exchange is carried out without the 
activation of the CACs – and investors are given to understand that any 
holdouts may not be repaid;  
 If participation is between 75 and 99 percent, then first a ballot is convened at 
which existing bondholders – which include the individuals committed to 
tendering – vote to change the payment terms of the old bonds to align them 
with those of the newly offered bonds. Only after that does the exchange 
become effective, new bonds are issued, and the old bonds change title.   
 
Provided that it is credible that the 75 percent threshold will be reached, the effect of 
an offer that is structured in this manner would be to eliminate all holdouts and reach 
100 percent participation (except for investors somehow did not notice that an 
exchange was being offered). The reason is that in these circumstances, investors will 
always do at least as well by tendering than by holding out. If participation is near 
universal (99 percent or more) and the creditor nonetheless holds out, she must fear 
not getting repaid. If, however, participation falls between 75 and 99 percent, then the 
CAC will be used, and holdouts will end up with an old, Greek law instrument whose 
(modified) payment terms are not better than those of the new English law bonds.  
 
As a result, participation would be near universal,7 CACs would not be invoked, and 
Greece might avoid being labelled “in default”.  Further, there is a good argument – at 
least based on the ISDA pronouncements so far – that the CDS contracts on Greek 
debt would not be triggered.  
  
A Complication with Silver Linings: The Foreign-Law Bonds 
 
In recent discussions regarding a possible Greek restructuring, the complication posed 
by Greece’s stock of English- and Swiss-law bonds has largely been ignored.  We do 
not have concrete figures on the exact amounts outstanding, but our guess is that there 
is about 15-20 bn Euros of such debt.  That is not an amount that Greece can afford to 
                                                 
7 We say “near universal” because apart from creditors that make a mistake or missed the deadline, it is 
possible that some creditors would hold out for the express purpose of litigating. However, one would 
expect this group to be very small, if it exists at all, since the prospect of suing in a Greek court must be 
distinctly unattractive to a holdouts, including because any proceeding would be expected to continue 
for years, and because a Greek court is likely to be less sympathetic to a litiguous holdout than a 
foreign court. Consistent with this, market reports indicate that distressed debt funds that specialize in 
litigation have bought English-law rather than Greek-law bonds (White and Wilkes, 2012).    
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ignore, given its current financial state.  Furthermore, if press reports that hedge funds 
hold a high percentage of these bonds are correct, paying them in full while imposing 
costs on Eurozone taxpayers will be a distasteful pill for Eurozone politicians to 
swallow. Hence, these bonds will need to be restructured. 
 
To what extent would the three restructuring options described above carry over to 
these foreign-law bonds? They do, but all of them would be less effective in the sense 
that it could be harder (or, for a given quality of the offer, less likely) to obtain the 
majorities to make them work.  
 
 Option 1: Just CACs. Greek foreign-law bonds have CACs but do not have 
aggregation clauses. Hence, they need to be voted on bond-by-bond. This 
makes it even more difficult to obtain the requisite (75 percent) supermajority, 
particularly since it is conceivable that in some cases distressed debt funds 
have acquired sufficiently large shares (that is, greater than 25 percent) of 
individual bond series that would effectively give them a veto over the 
restructuring using CACs.  
 Option 2: CACs plus an Exit Exchange. In the form described in the previous 
section, this technique would not add anything to the “Just CACs” option for 
foreign law bonds, because one cannot incentivize the holders of these bonds 
to vote in favour of payment reductions by promising them enhanced 
contractual protections of the type typically found in English-law sovereign 
bonds (they already have them!).8 This said, it might be possible to use the 
conventional Exit Exchange technique as a stick rather than a carrot, that is, by 
asking exiting bondholders to consent to a change in non-payment terms that 
would strip creditors’ protections from the remaining old bonds.9  
 Option 3: Exit exchange in the shadow of a CAC. Again, this approach is 
possible but more difficult to pull off, because it relies on a credible threat that 
CACs will actually be used. Without aggregation clauses and with the 
possibility that some creditors may have bought blocking shares, this is more 
difficult, and the use of the Exit Exchange technique may not help much.  
 
To conclude, the bargaining power of creditors is likely to be higher for the English-
law bonds than for the Greek-law bonds, particularly when individual creditors own 
sufficient bonds to block the use of CACs. In these cases, the Greek government may 
not have a choice but to negotiate and settle with these creditors. In other cases, any of 
the three Options remains feasible, with Options 2 and 3 offering the relatively largest 
chance of success if combined with an Exit Exchange offer. But even with this added 
incentive, persuading the holders of English-law bonds to accept an exchange offer is 
likely to require a better offer than in the case of the Greek-law bonds (Choi, Gulati 
and Posner, 2011).  
 
There are a couple of silver linings to the foregoing though.  First, the higher 
payments to these holders of foreign-law bonds will confirm to the holders of local-
law bonds the reality that they will be de facto subordinated if they do not tender. This 
                                                 
8 The voting threshold for changes in non-payment terms in the outstanding Greek English-law bonds 
that we have seen are almost as high (67 percent) as for the changes to payment terms. Hence, 
compared to “Just CACs”, this will help only if the supermajority in favor of the exchange is higher 
than 67 but lower than 75 percent. 
9 These are also known as “Exit Consents”, and were used in Ecuador’s 2003 exchange.  See note 6. 
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may help convince the holders of the Greek-law bonds accept an exchange offer in 
which they are offered an “upgrade” to English-law bonds.  Second, Greece is going 
to want to tap the international bond markets again.  It is going to be a long time, 
however, before foreign investors are going to be willing to lend to Greece in local-
law bonds again.  However, if Greece treats its English-law bonds well and in a 
manner consistent with their superior contractual protections, it may be able to issue 
new English-law bonds relatively soon.   
 
The Steps Ahead 
  
A recurring theme in the discussion so far is that the effectiveness in bringing 
potential holdouts to the table will depend on the credibility of the prospect that CACs 
would actually be invoked. “Retrofitting” such a clause is not by itself enough to 
solve the problem. Hence, Greece needs to continue bargaining in good faith with the 
institutional creditors to secure the supermajority to invoke it. Even with the 
reassurance that holdouts will not go scot free, there is a limit to which institutional 
creditors can be squeezed. In particular, the haircut Greece can extract from creditors 
will be limited by an outside option available to all creditors: to sell their bonds to 
“distressed debt funds” that would acquire them purely for the purposes of litigation 
and eventual settlement. The business model of these funds requires them to buy debt 
at very low prices – our guess is someplace below 20 cents for each Euro of face 
value – to make risky litigation and settlement negotiations worthwhile. That said, in 
the case of Greece, which is bound not only by domestic law and courts but also by 
EU law and EU institutions, the prospects for successful litigation might be higher 
than is typical, and hence the minimum value that creditors must be offered in order to 
accept might also be higher.  
 
Among the three options presented above, Options 2 or 3 offer the best prospects of 
achieving a high haircut with universal or near-universal creditor participation. Which 
among these two options is preferable depends on whether invoking CDS (which 
would happen for sure under Option 2) is viewed as a problem or not.10 Either option 
requires a 75 creditor percent participation, which ideally would be secured through a 
negotiated agreement. If, however, such an agreement were to remain elusive, Greece 
can and attempt to implement either of these options in the form of a unilateral 
exchange offer – the standard approach used in emerging market crises in the last 15 
year. Even without the backing of a CAC, this has often been successful (Bi et al, 
2011). Specifically, it should make private sector creditors the best offer it can afford 
with the backing of its official creditors. It should offer some cash upfront – 15 cents 
on the Euro is a good number – as well as an upgrade in the bond contracts that make 
them harder to restructure in the event of a new crisis. It should set a minimum 
participation threshold of at least 75 percent below which the offer would be retracted. 
And it should make it clear that it does not commit to repaying holdouts on the old 
terms.  
 
                                                 
10 This difference in Option 2 and Option 3 in terms of whether the CDS contracts will be triggered is 
only relevant if one assumes that Greece will not have to use CACs to restructure its foreign-law bonds 
(that is, if Option 3 will also be successful in the case of the foreign-law bonds).  If not, the 
restructuring of the foreign-law bonds would trigger the typical CDS contracts regardless of whether 
Option 2 or Option 3 is used with the local-law bonds.  This is because the typical CDS contract is 
written on a package of loans and bonds from the entity (here, Greece) as opposed to on a single bond.   
 10
If this happens, the holders of its English-law and Swiss-law bonds will likely be able 
to accelerate their obligations and sue in foreign courts.  They may even be able to 
attach some assets and obtain partial payment.  The holders of local-law Greek bonds 
though will have to bring their claims under Greek law and in Greek courts.  That is 
not going to be an attractive proposition to any creditor.  With this approach, it is 
likely to get high participation -- perhaps not 99 percent, but well in excess of the 
minimum participation threshold. There would be litigation, but it would be limited. 
This is the best that Greece can and should do under worst case assumptions. 
 
Among Greece’s many problems, conducting a successful orderly debt exchange 
involving a large haircut is perhaps the most tractable. It may not by itself restore 
Greece to solvency, but it is likely to be a critical component of any comprehensive 
solution. With good design, good faith, and speed, it could succeed.  
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